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Abstract
The paper provides an empirical analysis of fiscal incentives for Russian
regional governments to foster economic growth and development. It points out
several serious problems with previous empirical studies of fiscal incentives in
Russian federalism, develops a new theoretical framework for the analysis of
revenue-sharing policy between central and regional governments, paying
particular attention to the case of non-benevolent authorities, and provides new
estimates of incentive effects using an improved econometric methodology and a
newly-collected dataset. Contrary to existing studies, incentives for regional
governments are estimated to be present, but these incentive effects are
considerably weaker in the short run than in the long run.
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I. Introduction
In a federation as huge and heterogeneous as Russia the role of governance
and economic policies at the regional level is of particular importance for economic
development. But Russian regional authorities are deprived of traditional fiscal
instruments: all taxes in Russia are collected by the federal Ministry of Tax
Collection and are subsequently distributed among three levels of government
(federal, regional, and local) according to certain rules. Regional authorities have
almost no ability to set tax rates2 and very limited freedom of expenditure due to
significant share of spending being mandated by the federal centre. Furthermore the
rules of revenue sharing between federal and regional budgets are set almost
unilaterally by the central government. However regional authorities do possess a
number of instruments and policies that can help to attract mobile labour and
capital to the region and to foster economic growth. An important question is
whether they have incentives to do so and how appropriate incentives can be
created within the framework of Russian fiscal federalism.
The theoretical analysis of the paper shows that the elasticity of regional
government revenue with respect to gross regional product (GRP) can serve a
measure of fiscal incentives for regional governments in a federation where the
power to levy and collect taxes rests almost entirely with the federal authorities.
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 The freedom of regional governments to choose tax rates or impose taxes was negligible, for
instance they could collect either a parking duty or a 5% sale tax (the latter option was generally
preferred, of course).
2The paper focuses on the case of non-benevolent (rent-seeking) governments when
fiscal incentives are particularly important for economic development.
Several studies have analysed the role of incentives in fiscal federalism using
the framework of principal-agent models (Persson and Tabellini (1996), Bordignon
et al. (2001), see also the survey in Lockwood, 1999). Bordignon et al. (2001)
showed the importance of commitment of the central government to ex ante chosen
revenue-sharing schemes. Weingast (1995) and Qian and Weingast (1997)
emphasized the particular importance of fiscal incentives in economies in
transition. Jin et al. (1999) and Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) argued that Chinese
subnational governments have better incentives than their Russian counterparts.
Litwack (2002) showed that strict federal control is unlikely to solve the incentive
problem in economies with significant corruption. The measure of incentives
proposed in this paper is consistent with this literature and captures the idea of
commitment of the central government to certain revenue-sharing schemes.
However, little empirical work has been done in this area so far. In Russia
the first attempt to measure incentive effects in Russia was made by Zhuravskaya
(2000). By regressing the change in local governments’ shared revenues on the
change in their own revenues, Zhuravskaya found that an increase in own revenues
was almost entirely offset by a decrease in shared revenues, suggesting that local
governments had no incentives to increase their revenue-raising. Alexeev and
Kurlyandskaya (2003) run a similar regression for municipalities of one Russian
region. Their results show that changes in own revenues have a significant negative
impact only on changes in planned transfers but not on actual transfers, suggesting
that incentives were quite strong.
Despite the contradictory conclusions of these two empirical studies, the
general consensus in the literature is that fiscal incentives in Russia have been very
weak, particularly in comparison with those in China. The present paper questions
this consensus. An alternative approach to measuring incentives is suggested and
implemented on a newly collected data set that is more detailed and systematic than
those used before. Contrary to the previous studies, the estimation reveals that
fiscal incentives for regional governments in the Russian Federation do exist in
both the long and the short run, however the short-run incentives, which are the
most important, should be strengthened.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses
particularities of Russian fiscal federalism and the role of fiscal incentives for the
3development of Russia. Section III presents and analyzes a simple model of
revenue sharing and examines the role of elasticity of regional government revenue
with respect to GRP. Section IV deals with problems of econometric estimation of
incentive effects and section V presents the empirical results. Concluding remarks
follow.
II. Why do incentives matter?
2.1. Moral hazard and adverse selection.
 How can Russian regional
authorities contribute to faster economic growth? Firstly, though regional
governments cannot vary taxes or officially grant tax abatements (as in Lithuania
for instance) they can “protect” regional businesses from federal tax collectors and
thus affect the actual tax burden in the area3. Secondly, they can (to a large extent)
guarantee political stability in the region. Thirdly, they can improve the economic
environment and investment climate in the region by adopting appropriate regional
legislation, enforcing the rule of law, and reducing bureaucracy. In addition,
regional expenditure is not entirely mandated so there is space for providing better
public services, e.g. health care.
Benevolent regional governments will pursue such policies if they result in
higher welfare for the inhabitants. However regional governments may be self-
interested rather than benevolent. Self-interested governments may maximize the
size of budget (the “leviathan” type of government depicted by Brennan and
Buchanan, 1977) or they may maximize personal rents from managing budget
resources rather than social welfare (i.e. be corrupt and rent-seeking)4. Self-
interested governments will foster regional growth if they can extract benefits from
accelerated development (higher budget revenue for the leviathan or extra personal
rents for corrupt officials). The problem is that regional growth will not necessarily
lead to higher budget revenue or personal benefits of local authorities. Since all
revenues are subject to sharing with the centre according to the rules set by the
central government, it is up to the federal policy-makers to decide what the revenue
of successful regions will be.
The central government has several reasons to stimulate regions via revenue
sharing schemes. Firstly, the vast territory of the Russian Federation and the
geographical heterogeneity of the regions make it impossible to control efficiently
                                                
3
 See for instance a case study in Cai and Treisman (2004).
4
 Some forms of corruption at the regional level in Russia in the 1990s and their relation to
federalism are discussed in Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) and Cai and Treisman (2004).
4the economic and political situation in regional centres such as Vladivostok from
Moscow, implying that subnational governments will inevitably have a large
degree of economic and budget autonomy. They know the situation in the region
better than the central authorities and it is regional economic policy rather than the
federal government policy that will largely affect economic development of the
territories and eventually of the federation as a whole.
Secondly, Bordignon et al. (2001) show the importance of incentive
mechanisms due to asymmetric information and differences between revenue
distributions ex ante and ex post. “Ex ante” here refers to the plans of revenue
distribution before the fiscal year begins and “ex post” to the resulting distribution
at the end of the fiscal year when the actual amounts of taxes collected become
known to the governments of all levels. Regional authorities know the economic
situation in the region in great detail whereas central authorities only observe the
results of economic activity. A desire of a benevolent central government to
equalize ex post regional budget expenditure regardless of the sources of inequality
leads to moral hazard problems: undertaxation and overspending at the regional
level and the lack of incentives to extend the regional tax base. Indeed, an
overspending or undertaxing regional government will benefit from equalizing
transfers at the expense of other regions; looking “poorer” allows a region to free-
ride on the effort of its neighbours.
The revenue sharing game with a redistribution rule can be also modelled as
an adverse selection problem. In the adverse selection framework the federal
government acts as a principal and regions can be treated as agents of
heterogeneous types, not directly observed by the principal. Each region can
pretend to be richer or poorer. Depending on the type of the region the central
government offers one revenue sharing scheme or another. Schemes must be
incentive compatible, i.e. it must not be in the interest of regions with high
economic potential to be classified as poor regions to get a better revenue sharing
“contract”. It is well known that in the repeated setting the outcome with full
commitment is more efficient than that with no commitment to a certain
distribution rule (e.g. Townsend, 1982).
However the Russian federal government consistently lacked commitment in
the 1990s. There was no stability in the revenue sharing schemes throughout the
decade. The rules changed each year rather haphazardly, with the regional share in
VAT, the most important and well-collected tax in Russia, changing not only over
5time (from 0% to 50%) but also across regions. If a region achieved extra revenue
in a particular year it was generally withdrawn in three ways: explicitly, by
reducing the regional share in consolidated budget revenues or – more commonly –
implicitly, either by cutting down federal grants and transfers or by assigning extra
expenditure responsibilities (so called “mandates”) to the regions. This lack of
commitment resulted in complete distortion of incentives.
The lack of commitment and renegotiation of the “contract” ex post (when
the agent has already revealed its type to the principal) is known as the “ratchet
effect” in adverse selection games. This concept can be also applied to revenue
sharing in a federal economy. The simplest example of a ratchet effect is when the
central government cuts down the ex ante planned federal transfers and grants to
those regions which achieved higher own budget revenue than they were expected
to. Empirical evidence on the ratchet effect in the context of revenue sharing will
be discussed in section V.
The distortion of incentives had another very harmful consequence for the
economy: in some regions up to 30% of regional budgets were implemented in the
form of barter and money surrogates, which almost blocked the normal functioning
of the economy (OECD, 2000). This undesirable phenomenon was due to two
reasons. First, the monetization of the economy was very low – the ratio of M2 to
GDP was 13% to 19% in the second half of the 1990s, compared to 92% in China
(IMF IFS 2002). Secondly, when all revenues in the form of money are subject to
unfair sharing with the centre and surrogates are certainly not, the latter form
becomes particularly attractive for regional authorities.
2.2. Incentives for rent-seeking governments.  Commitment is thus a
necessary condition for any successful incentive scheme. What additional
arrangements are required to maintain incentives for rent-seeking governments?
The most obvious solution would appear to involve strict central control over
regional expenditure. However the ability of the central government to control
regional spending and economic policies is very limited in practice. A model by
Litwack (2002) shows that such control, even if theoretically possible, will be
extremely costly and may soon become useless due to corruption. Hence legal
prosecution alone cannot solve the problem of incentives efficiently. The traditional
literature on fiscal federalism assumes that regional decision makers are
accountable to the voters who elect them. However casual examination does not
show that Russian voters are able to “punish” governments and legislatures whose
6policies contradict their interests, though this issue requires further empirical
investigation.
If neither federal nor voter controls work, how can incentives for self-
interested governments to foster economic growth be created? A very stylized
model will help to answer this question and provide some insight into the nature of
incentives for regional governments.
III. The model
3.1. The revenue sharing game. Consider the following simple model of
revenue sharing between the central and the regional governments. The central
government sets the overall tax rate τ ∈[0; 1] on regional output y. As discussed
above the tax system is designed by the central government, which is free to choose
the overall tax rate at its own discretion and outside the revenue sharing game.
Hence τ is assumed to be preset and exogenous in the revenue sharing model
below.  Output in the region is given by:
y = y0 g Gδδδ < 1, y0 > 0 (1)
where g is the amount of regional public goods provided, G is the amount of
national public goods provided, and y0 is “basic potential output”. This latter term
captures the potential of the regional economy and the distortionary effect of
taxation (so that y0 can be thought of as a decreasing function of τ), and it is also
exogenous. Investments in national public goods (such as law and order) and local
public goods (such as infrastructure or health care) are assumed to be
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   δ < 1 reflects diminishing returns to general
government spending.
The central government collects τy in taxes and unilaterally determines the
revenue of the regional government e(y) as a function of regional output. Hence the
difference τy - e(y) constitutes the federal government revenue. The representative
consumer in the region has the following preferences over public goods and private
consumption x:
U(g, G, x
g
G !!
x"  (2)
Private consumption x is output net of taxes:
7x
 = (1 - τ)y (3)
Regional authorities can to some extent be rent-seeking and they split the
budget between expenditure on public goods g and private political rents c.
Following Edwards and Keen (1996) politicians’ preferences are assumed to be of
the following form:
Vr(g, G, x, c
c !#g, G, x), 0 ≤≤ 1 (4)
Thus regional politicians differ in the weight they attach to their personal rents
relative to their voters’ welfare. A regional leader with  = 0 is benevolent, while
one with  = 1 is a leviathan that spends the entire budget on private rents.
Similarly the central government is allowed to be rent-seeking and have a different

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Vc(g, G, x, C
C !#g, G, x), 0 ≤≤ 1 (5)
where the amount of political rents extracted at the federal level is denoted by C.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the central government chooses
the revenue sharing rule e(y) and announces it to the region. At the second stage the
central and the regional government simultaneously choose their levels of public
spending G and g (and their political rents C and c) as to maximize their respective
welfare functions subject to the balanced budget and production constraints.
The problem of the central government is:
CG ,
max 
' !
g !
G ! !!
x (6)
s.t. x = (1 - τ) y0 g Gδ (7)
C + G = τ y0 g Gδ – e(y0 g Gδ) (8)
The problem of the regional government is:
cg ,
max 
 !
g !
G ! !!
x (9)
s.t. x = (1 - τ) y0 g Gδ (10)
c + g = e(y0 g Gδ) (11)
The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium (implying Nash
equilibrium at the second stage).
Though the model is very stylized and, for instance, abstracts from
interregional redistribution issues by considering only one typical region in a
federation, it has two features essential for the analysis of fiscal incentives. It
allows the importance of central and regional expenditure for economic
development to differ and it also allows for different levels of political rent-seeking
on the part of both central and regional authorities.
83.2. Creating incentives for good quality governance at the regional
level. The quality of governance can be measured in different ways, but in the
above model it is natural to associate good governance with relatively low political
rents and relatively high public good provision and to use the ratio of “productive”
local public expenditure g to regional government revenue as a measure of quality
of governance:  = )( ye
g
. If  = 0 then local authorities only extract political rents
and thus waste all budget resources. At the other extreme all budget revenues are
used to finance productive public goods and  = 1. The higher is , the better is the
quality of governance in the region (although higher values of  may be associated
with higher absolute values of waste).
Denote the elasticity of regional government revenue with respect to GRP by
ε: ε(y) = y
ye
ye
)(
)(/
. Then the following proposition describes the quality of
governance in the region5:
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+Γ γε
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β−1
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Hence the quality of governance in the region is an increasing function of the
elasticity of regional government revenue with respect to GRP and the stimulating
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revenue sharing rule is sufficiently sensitive to changes in output (ε is high), then
by choosing efficient expenditure rather than personal rents regional authorities
significantly increase the amount of budget funds available to them, including the
funds available for corrupt use. Hence regional output will be higher and the
proportion of diverted budget funds will be lower (even if the absolute value of
political rents rises).
	
			→ 0 (implying Γ → +			→ 1 for any e(y).
	
			→ 1 (implying Γ → 0) 		→	ε.
Corollaries 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate the earlier point that fiscal incentives are
crucial primarily in the case of highly rent-seeking and corrupt governments. With
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Corollary 1.4. If ε → 	
 	!	
			→ 1.
Corollary 1.4 implies that when corruption in the regions is a very serious
issue, the central government may wish to design revenue sharing schemes with
higher than unit elasticity of regional government revenue with respect to GRP,
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expenditure goes to zero. An example of such an incentive scheme is the lump-sum
redistribution that underlies the recent practice of revenue sharing between Chinese
provinces and Beijing: a province has to collect a fixed amount of taxes for the
federal government and is allowed to keep all revenues above this fixed duty. This
approach is described and advocated by Jin et al. (1999), who find that under the
existing Chinese redistribution scheme from every extra yuan of tax revenues
collected in the region only 0.24 yuan goes to the centre whereas it used to be 0.55
yuan before the reform. This lump-sum based redistribution significantly improved
the incentives for Chinese provinces and reduced the ratchet effect. With lump-sum
revenue sharing the ratio of regional government expenditure to output (E / Y) is
increasing in Y and the corresponding elasticity is expected to exceed unity.
Under another incentive-enhancing scheme if a region collects more taxes
than it was expected to, it is awarded with a transfer from the centre and
underperforming regions may be penalized symmetrically. Bordignon et al. (2001)
show the optimality of this rule for achieving incentive compatibility in the
principal-agent problem outlined in section II. With fiscal effort based revenue
sharing an increase in GRP can lead to a more than proportional increase in
regional government expenditure due to an additional “carrot” resulting in a higher
than unit elasticity of regional government revenue with respect to GRP. Hence the
elasticity measure of incentives correctly identifies major incentive promoting
schemes.
If a 10% increase in GRP results in a 10% increase in regional government
revenue the elasticity measure of incentives will be equal to unity, which will be
indicative of strong incentives and the quality of governance will depend positively
on the relative importance of local public goods for the development of the
economy. Programmes of interregional equalization and stabilization will normally
10
shift the elasticity of regional expenditure with respect to GRP away from unity as
some part of extra revenue collected in successful regions will be used to help out
their less successful neighbours, but as proposition 1 shows, regional government
revenue must remain elastic to preserve incentives for successful regions to invest
in the economy and extend the tax base.
Since the balanced budget condition is assumed, regional revenue and
regional expenditure do not differ and for the purposes of empirical analysis it is
more convenient to work with the elasticity of regional expenditure since the data
on revenue often excludes federal bail-outs and other “last minute” sources of
revenue.
3.3. Importance of fiscal incentives. Having obtained some insights into
how incentives for regional governments can be created and measured, the next
logical step is to look at the importance of such incentives for the development of
the economy in various cases. Treisman (2003) argues that decentralization-
induced fiscal incentives for regional governments have no effect on the economy
(or at least no predictable effect) since whenever incentives for regional
governments are improved incentives for the central government are weakened so
as to exactly offset the effect of improved incentives in the regions. However such
arguments fail to take into account both the degree and the design of
decentralization. The latter is captured by the proposed elasticity measure of
incentives, while the degree of decentralization can be represented by the share of
regional government revenue in the consolidated budget revenue (federal and

&
y
ye
τ
)(
. Proposition 2 demonstrates how the design and the degree of
decentralization jointly affect the quality of governance at the central level c
(defined similarly to , i.e. c = )(yey
G
−τ
).
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Hence a higher elasticity of regional revenue with respect to GRP indeed
weakens the incentives for the central government, but this negative effect can be
softened by appropriate choice of the degree
 
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
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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
of decentralization itself does not affect the quality of regional governance). Thus
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an appropriate combination of the degree and the design of decentralization can
create incentives for high quality governance at both the central and regional levels.
Although the equilibrium elasticity of regional government revenue and the
equilibrium degree of decentralization will be partially interdependent under almost
any revenue sharing scheme, general policy guidelines can be obtained from
proposition 2.
Corollary 2.1. For a given ε	#	
	c 			
If incentives for good regional governance are not very strong, a higher
decentralization of government will improve the quality of governance at the
central level. The intuition here is as follows. Returns to investment in national
public goods are initially high but diminishing so it is initially rational to devote a
large proportion of the central government budget to economic growth while, as the
revenue grows, central government officials switch to private rents extraction.
Corollary 2.2. For a given ε	!	
	c 	$		%			&	'
that ε		
	c 	$$		.
However if strong regional incentive schemes are implemented it is
necessary to leave a substantial part of government finance under federal control in
order to preserve incentives for the central government. When the revenue sharing
rule becomes very elastic, most benefits of economic expansion stay with the
region and public good provision is no longer attractive for the central authorities,
who therefore initially divert a large proportion of budget resources for their private
use. But since the marginal utility of substitution of public and private goods for
political rents is also diminishing, at some point (as the budget grows) central
government authorities switch back to public good provision.
Corollary 2.3. 		→ 0 (implying ∆ → +		c →	
						→
1 (implying ∆ → 0) 	c → 
π
πεδ
−
−
1
1
.
The intuition regarding the importance of the quality of central governance is
the same as in the case of regions: incentives for the central government are
particularly important if officials are corrupt or centrally provided public goods are
crucial for successful economic development (δ is high).
The basic ideas developed in this section will now be used in the empirical
analysis of incentives for high quality governance in Russian regions in sections IV
and V.
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IV. Estimating incentives for good quality regional governance.
4.1. Basic approach. An extensive literature on the empirical estimation of
regional expenditure equalization and local shock smoothing has emerged recently
(see the survey in Mélitz and Zumer, 2002), but less empirical work has been done
on incentive effects. Zhuravskaya (2000) made the first attempt to measure such
effects in Russia by estimating the following regression by OLS and fixed effects:
∆Titi1∆Rit2POPit3tYeart + εit, (12)
where ∆Tit is the change in shared revenues of local governments, ∆Rit is the
change in own revenues,  POPit is population of municipality i at time t,  i  are
regional fixed effects, and Yeart are year dummies.
The null hypothesis of no incentives for high quality governance can be

*  1 = -1: in this case an increase in region’s own revenues is
	

  %         1 = 0 shared
revenues available to the municipalities are independent of their own revenues
      	   1 obtained by
+,
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

1 = -1 was not rejected leading to
the conclusion that fiscal incentives for Russian municipalities were non-existent.
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya [AK] (2003) point out that the data set used by
Zhuravskaya (two to seven years of data for 35 Russian cities within 29 regions)
was limited and fragmentary. Their critique can be reinforced by noticing that local
authorities submitted data voluntarily upon request. If the municipalities prepared
to submit the data were those that had suffered from the centre’s withdrawal of
transfers in response to an increase in the municipality’s own revenue, while those
that had not suffered did not submit data, Zhuravskaya’s results will be seriously
affected by self-selection bias. AK also notice that the non-per-capita specification
(12) puts greater weight on large municipalities (it should be further noticed that it
almost surely leads to the heteroscedasticity of the error term, the variance of which
is most likely to be proportional to population).
Amending specification (12) accordingly, AK ran a similar regression for all
55 municipalities of Rostovskaya oblast, one of the 89 Russian regions, in the years
1996-1998:
∆Titpci1∆Ritpc2POPit3Yeart + εit,    
(13)
where ∆Titpc is now a change in per capita transfers to municipality i and ∆Ritpc is a
change in per capita own revenue. The point estimate of 1 becomes –0.21, which
13
is significantly different from –1 and this rejects the null hypothesis of no
municipal incentives.
However, some serious problems with the AK estimation procedure raise
doubts about this conclusion. Firstly the standard errors of estimation are large
	1 = 0 cannot be rejected (this was not tested explicitly
by the authors). Can it then be concluded that fiscal incentives were strong?
Secondly, though the data set is systematic, it remains unclear how representative
the case of Rostovskaya oblast is and whether one can generalize the results for
Russia as a whole. Thirdly, just converting variables into per capita form does not
solve the problem of the disproportionate influence of large municipalities on the
results. To get rid of it one should take logarithms to give equal significance to a
one per cent change in the revenue of both small and municipalities. Besides,
specification (13) mixes the first differences of some variables with the levels of
others in a way not justified by the authors.
AK draw attention to two other drawbacks of Zhuravskaya’s approach.
Firstly, her estimation procedure can identify only the effect of a change in own
revenues on transfers within the same year. Any delayed effects are not identified.
If the regional (federal) government responds to an increase in local (regional)
government own revenue by leaving current transfers unchanged but totally
withdrawing the transfers planned for the next year, the estimation procedure
reports strong incentive effects, whereas in reality they are quite weak. Secondly,
Zhuravskaya’s method is very sensitive to the definition of different categories of
revenue. For example, if revenues that used to go to the regional budget and were
then returned to municipalities in the form of intergovernmental transfers are
assigned to local budgets on a regular basis, then the change is a pure accounting
one which should have no incentive effects. However, the data will register an
increase in own revenue and a decrease in transfers exactly offsetting this increase,
resulting in a misleading conclusion that 1 = -1 and incentives are absent. The
seriousness of the latter problem should not be underestimated since changes of
revenue definition happened very frequently in Russia throughout the 1990s.
4.2. An extension of the basic approach. To circumvent partly these two
problems, AK disentangle the change in transfers following a change in local
government own revenue into two components -- the deviation of the actual
transfer from the plan and the change in the planned transfer from current year t to
year t + 1 – and regress them separately on the same set of explanatory variables as
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in specification (13). The first component is meant to capture the issue of
commitment whereas the second captures dynamics. AK estimate that planned
transfers respond negatively to changes in own revenue, but do not fully offset
them, thus undermining incentives, though to a lesser extent than if these were
current year transfers that responded to the changes in own revenue collection.
Unfortunately planned values of transfers in Russia are not verifiable: they
exist only on paper and have an economic meaning only under sufficient
commitment of the upper tier government to revenue sharing rules (i.e. in the case
of strong incentive effects). In claiming to test the null hypothesis of non-existent
incentives AK face the problem that in this case the plans do not indicate the upper
tier authorities’ genuine intentions due to the absence of commitment, so that their
test appears to be based on an inconsistency. Actually AK faced major difficulties
using planned transfers together with actual ones and had to exclude nine richer
municipalities out of 55 (since their inclusion totally altered the results). As the
exclusion of municipalities from the sample was clearly non-random the results
were affected by selection biases and the lack of robustness makes it very difficult
to have any confidence in the findings. Both the use of subtle categories such as
planned transfers or own and shared revenues and the non-logarithmic specification
are likely to have contributed to the poor robustness of AK’s results.
The ability of their approach to capture dynamics is also limited to one year
lagged effects and depends crucially on the assumptions about commitment, so that
the short- and the long run effects still cannot be distinguished. The problems of the
sensitivity of the results to the rules of budget accounting have not been resolved
either. Thus although it is possible to resolve some of the problems with
Zhuravskaya’s estimates while remaining within her basic framework (such as the
non-logarithmic specification), the latter two problems require a fundamentally
different method of estimating fiscal incentives.
4.3. An alternative approach. 
 The theoretical analysis in section III
identified the elasticity of regional government expenditure with respect to GRP as
a suitable measure of fiscal incentives for good governance at regional level. The
suggested elasticity measure of incentives also reflects adequately the issue of
commitment. When the central government cannot commit to a revenue sharing
scheme and withdraws all extra revenue collected in the regions instead, regional
government revenue becomes completely inelastic and no longer depends on the
economic performance of the region, so that the regional government is left with no
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incentives to improve regional performance. High values of the elasticity of
regional expenditure with respect to GRP indicate that the central government is
committed to leaving a certain proportion of the benefits of accelerated regional
development to regional governments.
Although there is no one-to-one mathematical correspondence between the
proposed measure of incentives and that used in the previous studies, in fact they
are closely related. Suppose GRP goes up and regional own revenue increases
proportionally. If transfers to the region are reduced to offset completely the
increase in own revenue Zhuravskaya’s 1 is equal to -1 and the elasticity of
regional revenue is zero leading to the common conclusion of absent incentives. If
on the contrary transfers remain unaffected, 1 = 0 and the elasticity of regional
expenditure is close to unity6.  Once again the conclusions are expected to be
identical, namely that incentives are strong.
4.4. The choice of specification. The basic specification to measure the
elasticity of regional government expenditure with respect to GRP is:
eit =  δiyit + εit (14)
where e is the logarithm of real per capita regional expenditure, y is the logarithm
of real per capita GRP, and  is the elasticity to be estimated. The use of a panel
data model allows all relevant time-invariant differences between regions (δi) to be
controlled for, including the size of the region, its national composition, distance
from Moscow and the structure of the regional economy by industries. Two serious
problems to deal with are endogeneity and ambiguous causality. Current GRP is
expected to depend on current and past values of regional expenditure, since the
whole basis of fiscal incentives depends on the assumption that regional
governments invest in regional economies. Thus the explanatory variable y in
equation (14) is not exogenous so neither fixed effects nor pooled estimators are
consistent.7
In the panel framework the Arellano-Bond (1991) generalized method of
moments (GMM) approach can be used to deal with the endogeneity of explanatory
variables. After taking first differences of (14) the fixed regional effects disappear:
∆eit∆yit + ∆εit (15)
                                                
6
 The lower the proportion of transfers in regional government revenue, the closer to unity the
elasticity in question will be.
7
 The consequences of the violation of strict exogeneity assumptions for the fixed effects
estimator are discussed by Nickell (1981).
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The regressor ∆yit is still correlated with the error term and so is the first lag ∆yit-1.
But all lags of higher order ∆yit-2, ∆yit-3,… are uncorrelated with the error term and
can serve as instruments in the GMM framework8.
Another question is how the dependence between regional expenditure and
GRP should be interpreted: does higher GRP result in higher regional expenditure
or does government expenditure boost GRP? To distinguish between these two
effects a bivariate autoregression of the following panel form could in principle be
used9:
eit1i11eit-112yit + ν1it (16)
yit2i21yit-122eit + ν2it (17)
Unlike the basic model (13), the specification above permits short- and long-run
incentives to be distinguished. The former are reflected by the coefficient 12 and
the ratio 
11
12
1 γ
γ
−
 characterizes the long run relationship. This can be easily seen by
rearranging equation (16) in the error correction form:
∆eit1i11∆yit! !11)(eit-1 - 
11
12
1 γ
γ
−
yit-1) (18)
Of the two elasticity estimates the short run responses 12 are likely to be more
important since regional policymakers are likely to care more about the short run
because of the possibility of losing power, and the issue of commitment to revenue
sharing rules is essentially a short run issue.
Unfortunately the lack of degrees of freedom makes it impossible to estimate
the bivariate vector autoregression for every region separately and to obtain region-
specific incentive effects in this way. Therefore the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator
is applied to equation (16) treating variable yit as endogenous and using its lagged
differences of order 2 and higher and lagged differences of expenditure as
instruments.
Even if one is interested primarily in the short run effects, assumptions about
the long run are important to choose the right specification. Unfortunately with
only 7 annual observations it is impossible to test for co-integration of GRP and
regional expenditure properly even in the panel framework. If in fact series e and y
                                                
8
 GMM estimator was applied by Mélitz and Zumer (2002) in their study of interregional
stabilization and equalization in developed countries.
9
 A similar technique was used by Obstfeld and Peri (1998) in their study of interregional
stabilization in the USA.
17
are not co-integrated, the short run specification in first differences is10:
∆eit2i2∆yit + Z/it2 + νit (19)
To account for possible structural changes facilitating or impeding tax collection,
changes in the share of enterprises making losses in the region (variable “losses”);
the proportion of population employed in small businesses (variable
“smallbusiness”11); and the full set of time dummies are included as control
variables Z.
V. Results.
5.1. Basic (short-run only) approach. The approach described above is
implemented on a data set which is far more complete and systematic than those
used by Zhuravskaya and AK. The data are observations on 89 Russian regions for
the years 1994-200012. Regional and local budgets were aggregated into
“consolidated” regional budgets because of the general focus of the analysis on the
relations between the federal government and the regions.
Table 1 summarizes the results obtained by estimating equation (19). This
specification assumes no long-run relationship between regional expenditure and
GRP and hence no long-run incentives, as well as exogeneity of GRP. In this sense
it is close to Zhuravskaya’s method and can serve as a useful starting point of the
analysis.
                                                
10
 All variables in equation (19) are stationary if the GRP and expenditure series are integrated of
order 1. Numerous macroeconometric studies show that output normally should be treated as I(1)
series, though it has to be assumed rather than tested here.
11
 Available only for the subsample starting from 1996.
12
 See appendix 1 for a detailed description of data sources. Ten regions were excluded since
GRP and some other indicators were not calculated for 9 autonomous districts before 2000 and
for Chechnya. GRPs are converted to 2000 prices using national GDP deflators since regional
deflators are not computed. However this fact will not alter the results significantly: the analysis
of 1999 regional consumer price indices showed that the ratio of the standard deviation to the
mean was only 0.054.
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Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Method OLS FE RE FE OLS FE OLS FE
Number of observ. 470 470 470 314 470 470 437 437
R2 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.53
 2) 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.18
 (0.045)** (0.051)** (0.045)** (0.058)**

+ 0.34 0.33
 (0.097)** (0.113)**
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- 0.12 0.11
 (0.058)** (0.066)*
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 -0.01
 (0.028)
Constant 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.09 -0.09
 (0.017)* (0.018)* (0.017)* (0.018)* (0.019) (0.02) (0.028)** (0.024)**
Time effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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 2 = 1: t-st -18.04 -16.23 -18.04 -14.14 -10.31 -8.85 -21.37 -19.23
(p-value) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
Notes:
1. For coefficients standard errors are in parentheses, for tests p-values are in parentheses. Significance at
5% level is marked with **, at 10% -- with *.
2. Comparison of models 1-3. Hausman test statistic is 1.33 (p = 0.986) so the null hypothesis that random
effects assumptions are valid is not rejected. Lagrange multipliers Breusch and Pagan test statistic is 3.00 (p = 0.083)
for the null that the variance of random effects is zero (and pooling is justified). The F-test does not reject the
hypothesis that regional effects are homogeneous and pooled OLS can be implemented: F(78, 229) = 0.76 (p =
0.957).
  	
    	 	
  	  	

  	 		
  
+
 
-
 are equal:
for OLS F(1, 461) = 3.22 (p = 0.073); for fixed effects F(1, 383) = 2.33 (p = 0.128).
______________________________________________________________
The estimated short-run incentives are very low but significantly positive.
The point estimate is almost independent of the estimation method (pooled OLS,
fixed effects or random effects, see models 1-4 in the table 1) and stays within the
range of 0.17 to 0.2. All the coefficients have the expected signs: the higher the
share of loss making enterprises in the region the more difficult it is to collect
taxes, so the corresponding coefficient is negative. The impact of an increase in the
share of population employed in small businesses also affects expenditure
negatively since the tax revenue from bigger enterprises is once again easier to
collect, but the latter dependence proved to be insignificant.
5.2. Asymmetry of responses. The next question is whether regional
expenditure responds symmetrically to favourable and unfavourable shocks in
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output (models 5-6 in table 1). To test the hypothesis of symmetric responses
2
+
 = 2
-) variable ∆yit is replaced by two different regressors:
∆yit+ = I(∆yit > 0) ∆yit and ∆yit- = I(∆yit < 0) ∆yit,
where I(x) is an indicator function. With OLS, the p-value for this test is 0.073, so
that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 10% level but not at the 5% one. With
fixed effects this hypothesis is not rejected at standard significance levels. However
regional expenditure seems to be more responsive to upward changes in GRP than
to downward changes, with the response to downward changes even becoming
insignificant at the 5% level.
Higher responsiveness of expenditure to increases than to decreases in GRP
is a desirable feature of revenue sharing schemes. It indicates that the federal
system provides regions with some insurance in case of local (and even possibly
global) economic shocks while allowing regional governments to benefit more
from positive regional economic trends. This feature is found to be “weakly”
pronounced in Russia of the 1990s.
5.3. Long-run incentive effects. As discussed in section IV the estimates in
table 1 are only consistent in the absence of long-run effects and under exogeneity
of GRP. The only indirect evidence that such assumptions may not be totally
invalid for Russian regions comes from model D in table 2, where equation (17) is
estimated by the Arellano-Bond method. It yields an estimate of 22 that is very
close to zero suggesting that effects of expenditure on GRP were non-existent in
the 1990s and endogeneity problems may not have been too serious in practice.
Model A in table 2 shows how the results change when the long-run effects
and endogeneity of explanatory variables are taken into account and the Arellano-
Bond procedure is employed.
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Table 2. Estimates of the incentive effects
Model A B C D E
Method Arellano-Bond (16) Between Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond (17) Arellano-Bond
Dependent variable Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure GRP Expenditure
Number of
observations 474 562 562 474 527
R2 0.55 0.55
  0.61 0.92 0.58
(0.104)** (0.072)** (0.059)**
Taxes collected 0.48
(0.036)**
Expenditure(-1) 0.44 0.19
(0.044)** (0.037)**
Constant -1.27 -0.18
(0.256)** (0.203)
GRP(-1) 0.40
(0.081)**
Expenditure 0.02
(0.043)
Long-run elasticity 1.10 0.92 0.58 0.59
(0.164)** (0.072)** (0.059)** (0.052)**
Short-run elasticity 0.61  0.48
(0.104)** (0.036)**
	
    ! z = 3.75
 
z = 14.4
(p = 0.000)** (p = 0.000)**
Notes: For coefficients standard errors are in parentheses. For tests p-values are in parentheses. Significance at 5%
are marked with **, at 10% with *.
Hausman test favours fixed effects over random effects (p = 0.0006 for the null hypothesis of valid random effects).
__________________________________________________________________
The long run elasticity of regional expenditure with respect to output is
estimated to be not significantly different from unity. For comparison the fixed
effects and between estimates for the long run specification (14) are reported
(models B and C). These estimators can be justifiably used only if it is reasonable
to ignore the problems of endogeneity, causality and small sample biases due to
non-stationarity, which, as has been argued above, is not the case. The estimates in
models B and C turn out to be lower (as low as 0.58 for fixed effects), suggesting
that incentives are understated if such estimators are used. Though the between
estimator is more robust to possible dynamic misspecifications it still relies on the
strict exogeneity of the regressors (see Pesaran and Smith, 1995), which cannot be
justified in this case.
However the estimate of the short run elasticity that is of particular interest is
much lower: only 0.61. But this finding, unlike the results of Zhuravskaya (2000),
does not indicate total absence of incentives: the short run coefficient is
21
significantly different from zero at the 1% level and is closer to unity than to zero.
The results also differ from the findings of Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003) who
cannot reject the null hypothesis of full incentives13. But this difference is not
surprising. Though Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya use panel estimators, their analysis
is essentially cross-sectional: they use data on 46 cross-sectional units and only 2
time-series observations for each unit. Model B in table 2, using the between
estimator, which is known to exploit primarily the cross-sectional dimension in a
panel, leads to a similar result: a point estimate of 0.92, not significantly different
from 1, and thus no rejection of the null of strong incentives either. However this
result seems to be misleading since it is the time dynamics of revenue, expenditure,
transfers, and GRP in each region that matters most for incentives.
The estimation results imply that if GRP grows by 10%, the regional budget
revenue will only increase by approximately 6% in the short run. What factors
other than insufficient incentives may account for the result? Firstly, using
expenditure rather than revenue can theoretically lead to underreporting incentives
if regional governments smooth expenditure intertemporally. However there is no
evidence of significant intertemporal smoothing of expenditure in Russia in the
1990s. On the other hand data on revenue often do not include ex post federal
“bail-outs” and other “last minute” sources of funding, while  data on expenditure
reflect the actual amount of funds available to regional governments more
accurately. Secondly, the data are likely to be estimated with significant errors
leading to downward attenuation bias that is proportional to the ratio of the
variance of noise to the sum of the variances of noise and the regressor. However
the standard deviation of GRP across regions is about 0.7 times the mean and even
within one region it usually exceeds 0.05 of the mean so attenuation biases are
unlikely to be severe.
5.4. The ratchet effect.
 Depending on the assumptions and estimation
methods the short run elasticity of regional expenditure with respect to GRP stays
in the range of 0.17 to 0.61 (0.33 to 0.61 for upward changes in GRP). These
results cannot be directly compared with the studies of the ratchet effect in Russia
and China. But they can be interpreted as indirect evidence of a ratchet effect, in
which the central government in some way withdraws extra regional revenue if it
                                                
13
 As argued in footnote 9 an approximate analogue of the hypothesis  = 0 in specification (1)
will be the null hypothesis of  = 1 in specification (14). This approximation, although imperfect,
is used for comparison.
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exceeds the expected level: a 10% increase in GRP leads only to a 3.3% to 6.1%
increase in regional expenditure.
To get a better insight into whether the ratchet effect accounts for low
incentives the regressions are repeated with GRP being replaced with the total
amount of federal, regional, and local taxes collected in the region14. As expected,
the increase in own regional revenue seems to be partly offset by a decrease in
shared revenue and transfers, since a 10% rise in total taxes collected in the region
increases regional budget only by 2.5% to 4.8% (see model E in table 2 and models
7-8 in table 1) and the elasticity of expenditure with respect to the total amount of
taxes collected is significantly below unity.
Instead of the ratchet effect, these findings could in principle be explained by
the fact that federal taxes are more efficiently collected than the taxes going to
regional budgets and the possibility that the federal share in the consolidated
budget revenue of all three levels gradually increases over time. However the
federal share remained broadly constant over the period (fluctuating within the
range of 45% to 49%).
5.5. Structural stability.
 The robustness of all results to the inclusion or
exclusion of fixed time effects and other control variables and to the inclusion of
the second lag of expenditure into dynamic specification (16) has been checked.
Bearing in mind that one of the major shortcomings of the previous studies
of incentive effects in Russia was excessive sensitivity of the findings to the
inclusion or exclusion of certain cities or municipalities, it is important to check the
structural stability of the results. Treisman (1996) and Freinkman and Yossifov
(1999) find some profound differences in the mechanisms of revenue sharing
applied to the national republics and other (administrative) regions. The findings of
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003) are fundamentally different for poorer and
richer municipalities. Hence the sample was split into subsamples of national and
administrative regions15 and into subsamples of donors and recipients16. The main
                                                
14
 Unfortunately the data on tax collection are available for slightly later period, namely 1994
data is missing and 2001 data is added, however these data cover all the regions, including the
autonomous districts.
15
 National subsample includes 21 national republics, 10 autonomous districts and Jews’
autonomous oblast.
16
 There is no conventional definition of recipient regions. Here this word is used not for regions
receiving federal transfers and grants (only Moscow does not), but for those regions where all the
collected tax revenues (going to the central, regional, and local budgets) do not suffice to cover
23
results were robust to exclusion of any of these groups. For specification (16) the
Arellano-Bond estimate of the incentive coefficient remains significantly different
from both unity and zero and does not vary much (ranging from 0.51 to 0.78 in
different subsamples). The same is true for specification (19). The likelihood ratio
tests show that incentives for donors are slightly higher than for recipients and
other differences are statistically insignificant. Hence the main results prove to be
structurally stable.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has provided an empirical analysis of fiscal incentives for high
quality governance in Russian regions. In order to measure these incentive effects
the paper developed a new theoretical framework for the analysis of the appropriate
policy of revenue sharing between federal and regional governments in a federation
where the central government monopolizes the right to levy and collect all taxes,
determines the revenue sharing rules and restricts the fiscal freedom of regional
governments in other ways. The theoretical analysis shows that the quality of
governance in the regions (defined as the ratio of “productive” (as opposed to
wasteful) public expenditure to regional budget revenue) is increasing in the
elasticity of regional government revenue with respect to GRP and the importance
of fiscal incentives is particularly high if the authorities are not benevolent. A
popular argument states that this positive effect of decentralization will be
necessarily offset by the negative effect of decentralization on the incentives for the
central government. However it was shown that this argument fails to take into
account both the design and the degree of decentralization. Combining appropriate
design and degree of decentralization it turns out to be possible to create good
incentives for regional governments while maintaining strong incentives for the
federal authorities.
Using the elasticity of regional government expenditure with respect to GRP
as an alternative measure of incentive effects allows major problems that previous
empirical studies could not resolve to be circumvented: it distinguishes between the
incentive effects in the short run and in the long run and it is not sensitive to the
way in which different categories of budget revenue are defined. This approach,
and an improved econometric methodology, were used to estimate the incentive
effects of revenue-sharing between central and regional governments in Russia
                                                                                                                                                             
regional expenditure. Thirty out of 89 regions were estimated to be net recipients in 2001 and as
many as 50 in 1997. Twenty regions have been net recipients in all years.
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employing a newly-collected dataset that is more detailed and systematic than those
used in previous studies.
Contrary to previous studies, the results of the empirical analysis show that
fiscal incentives for regional governments in the Russian Federation do exist in
both the long and the short run, but the long run incentive effects are substantially
stronger than in the short run (with elasticity measures being around unity and 0.6
respectively), and thus the short-run incentives, which are the most important,
should be strengthened. It will be in the interests of both the federal and regional
governments.
It should be noted that the model used to assess the importance of the
elasticity of regional government revenue with respect to GRP did not allow for
interregional transfers and the analysis will need to be extended in this direction.
Certainly there exists a trade-off between stronger incentives and better
equalization of public goods provision and economic conditions across regions.
Equalization implies the transfer of funds from more successful regions to less
successful ones, inevitably affecting incentives negatively. But this trade-off exists
only in the short run. In the long run better incentives lead to faster economic
growth and a rapid increase in the amount of taxes collected. As a result more
funds become available for equalization and stabilization programmes.
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Appendix 1. Data sources.
The data was collected from numerous sources (mostly various official
paper-based yearbooks published by the Russian state statistical agency
Goskomstat in Russian) and united into the most complete and systematic data set
among those used for a comparable purpose. It covers all the 89 regions of the
Russian Federation and starts from 1994 since before 1994 many indicators of
interest – first of all GRP – were not computed. Individual sources for each
indicator are listed below.
GRP: Regiony Rossii (RR) 2002, pp. 297-298 (for year 2000), Rossiiskiy
Statisticheskiy Ezhegodnik (RSE) 2001, pp. 293-294 (for years 1994-1999).
GDP, GDP deflators: RSE 2001, pp. 289-292.
Tax collection by regions: Ministry of Tax Collection of the Russian
Federation (available at www.nalog.ru for 2001), Finansy v Rossii (FvR) 2002,
pp. 59-61 (for 2000), FvR 2000, pp. 60-63 (for years before 1999).
Data on regional and local budgets: Ministry of Finance of the Russian
Federation (available at www.minfin.ru for years after 2000), FvR 2000, pp. 33-43
(for years before 1999).
Population: RSE 2000, pp. 54-55 (for years before 2000), RR 2002,
pp. 30-31 (for years after 2001).
Employment, small businesses and financial results of economic activity: RR
2002, pp. 334-339, 776-780.
Consumer price indices by regions: RR 2002, pp. 827-830.
Appendix 2. Proofs of the propositions of section III.
Proposition 1.  The problem (9)-(11) of the regional government can be reduced
to:
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the first order condition (A2) becomes:
!e
/(y)y = Γe(y) - Γg ⇔ $ε = Γ - Γ ⇔  = 
1+Γ
+Γ γε (A3)
e(y) is a non-decreasing function of y so Vr(g) is concave and second order
conditions for maximum are satisfied.
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Other corollaries follow automatically from (A3).
Proposition 2. The problem (6)-(8) of the central government can be reduced
to:
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the first order condition (A5) becomes:
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Dividing the numerator and the denominator of the last term in (A6) by e(y) one
obtains:
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The corollaries follow automatically from (A7).
